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SINGLE-CASE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND THE ADVENT OF
NEUROIMAGING
Traditionally, neuropsychology investigates the brain-behavior relationship by using a lesion-based
approach. According to this approach, different brain areas subserve different cognitive processes
due to the modularity of the neural system and the anatomo-functional correlation. Leaving aside
the debate existing in the literature between single-case and group studies (e.g., Caramazza and
McCloskey, 1988; Robertson et al., 1993), it is well-regarded that data from single-cases have proved
to be very powerful in increasing our understanding on the neural correlates of cognition. In
literature, there are plenty of examples of neurological patients whose unique behavior crossed
the boundaries of science. This is the case of Phineas Gage whose frontal lesion led to deficits in
executive functions (Damasio et al., 1994) or HM, the most thoroughly studied case of anterograde
amnesia as a consequence of a temporal resection to alleviate severe epilepsy (Scoville and Milner,
1957). Other patients, though less known to the general public, had an extraordinary influence in
many fields of neuropsychology. This is the case of Mr. Leborgne (known as “Tan” because that
was the only word he could speak), whose behavior was fundamental for understanding language
production (Broca, 1861). Further examples can be found with regards to different functions.
Considering perception, for instance, we can mention studies about patients experiencing visual
field defects as a consequence of occipital lesions during the First World War indicating they could
complete visual forms across their blind hemifield (hemianopic completion, Poppelreuter, 1917;
Riddoch, 1917), or the study of conscious and unconscious behavior while identifying objects of
patient DF who developed visual agnosia following a ventral-stream damage (Goodale et al., 1991).
In this context, special mention must also be made of the large body of literature on blindsight
(Weiskrantz et al., 1974), with particular reference to patients FS, DB, and GY (Weiskrantz, 1986;
Stoerig and Cowey, 1997; Goebel et al., 2001). The extensive study of these patients, proven
to be able to unconsciously detect visual information within their blind field, contributed to
uncover aspects of the visual system that cannot be highlighted under physiological conditions.
All these examples have built up our knowledge not only on the correlation between the brain
and its functions but also on the cognitive functions themselves, as they have been essential in the
theorization of normal cognition.
The advent of neuroimaging techniques in the second half of the last century eventually
resulted in a reduction of single-case studies (Chatterjee, 2005; Fellows et al., 2005;
Medina and Fischer-Baum, 2017). On the one hand, the possibility to characterize brain
lesions gave a strong impulse on the localization of cognitive functions in the brain,
providing evidence on their anatomo-functional correlations. On the other hand, neuroimaging
techniques detecting in vivo brain activity (e.g., PET, fMRI and more recently fNIRS) and
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dynamics (e.g., EEG and MEG) or interfering with normal brain
processes (e.g., TMS) pushed the field toward the study of
healthy participants and groups of patients. As a consequence,
the number of papers on single-cases published on high-impact
journals is nowadays strongly reduced (Chatterjee, 2005). At
the same time, they are cited about three times less often than
neuroimaging papers (Fellows et al., 2005; Medina and Fischer-
Baum, 2017). Moreover, several journals previously publishing
single-cases do not accept such papers any longer, except for
selected cases (Medina and Fischer-Baum, 2017). Importantly,
however, other high-impact scientific journals, like Cortex
(Cubelli and Della Sala, 2017), have recently decided to devote
a section to single case reports to counteract the reduction of
single-case studies in literature given their potential value.
Here, we advocate for a renewed use of single-case studies
as a valuable tool to investigate cognition by taking advantage
of neuroimaging methods. The interest in single-case studies,
indeed, derives from the peculiarity either of their behavior or
their lesion. We trust that the combination of the lesion-based
approach alongside the use of neuroimaging techniques can have
a strong impact on the understanding of the brain-behavior
relationship. Crucially, focal brain damages can offer the unique
opportunity to test specific scientific accounts and to question
theoretical models of cognition.
THE CASE OF VISUAL AWARENESS: THE
CONTROVERSIAL CONTRIBUTION OF V1
AND THE ROLE OF THE DORSAL STREAM
IN ACCESSING CONSCIOUSNESS
One of the greatest challenges in the field of perceptual awareness
is to disentangle the role of different brain areas in generating
conscious experience. A still open debate exists as to whether
the activity in some specific areas correlates with the content
of conscious experience. Since the first observations of patients
with visual field defects (Holmes, 1945), it has become evident
that lesions to the primary visual cortex (V1) result in a loss of
perceptual awareness in the corresponding portion of the visual
field, implying a crucial role of V1 in consciousness. However,
the direct contribution of V1 in conscious visual experience
still remains controversial (Barbur et al., 1993; Crick and Koch,
2003; Tong, 2003; Stoerig, 2006; Ffytche and Zeki, 2011). In this
respect, an influential model (Lamme et al., 1998) states that V1
becomes crucial for consciousness when receiving feedback from
other areas. This advocates for a dynamical conceptualization of
cortical areas involvement in consciousness suggesting that the
sole feedforward activity from V1 to higher areas does not give
rise to consciousness.
Another influential model, the so-called two-streams
hypothesis (Goodale and Milner, 1992), postulates that visual
information processed along the dorsal stream (the “vision-
for-action” system), which is devoted to the transformation
of visual inputs into actions, is not available to consciousness
(Milner, 2012). Conversely, activity along the ventral stream
(the “vision-for-perception” system), which transforms the
visual input into a coherent representation of the outer world,
is suitable for conscious experience. At least in the initial
conceptualization of the model, V1 represents the common
origin (and the only contact point) of the two streams which
then diverge with the ventral stream projecting to the inferior
temporal cortex and the dorsal stream projecting to the superior
parietal cortex (specifically, superior parietal lobe, SPL, and
intraparietal sulcus, IPS).
Within these theoretical frameworks assuming that feedback
to V1 is essential for awareness and that activity in SPL/IPS
remains unconscious, studying a patient with a V1 lesion would
be very informative in testing the predictions of these models.
Over the last few years, we have extensively tested one
hemianopic patient, SL, using several methodologies, ranging
from pure behavioral measures (Celeghin et al., 2014, 2015;Mazzi
et al., 2016) to EEG/ERPs (Bollini et al., 2017; Sanchez-Lopez
et al., 2017; Mazzi et al., 2018b), TMS (Mazzi et al., 2014), TMS-
EEG co-registration (Bagattini et al., 2015), and, very recently,
fast near-infrared optical signal (Mazzi et al., 2018a).
Patient SL is a young woman suffering homonymous
hemianopia on her right visual field as a result of an ischemic
stroke. Structural MRI evidenced complete destruction of her left
V1 (Mazzi et al., 2014). Moreover, full-field visual stimulation
using fMRI did not show any activities in V1 (Celeghin
et al., 2015). Accordingly, TMS at supra-threshold intensities of
different portions of her lesioned occipital cortex did not result
in any conscious visual percepts (Bagattini et al., 2015), thus
excluding the presence of residual activity within her lesioned V1.
Having assessed that SL’s V1 lesion was complete and
circumscribed, we were in the privileged position to test these
models. If V1 and feedback to it are necessary for awareness
to emerge, as stated in Lamme’s model, a complete lesion
to V1 should prevent SL from having perceptual awareness
in her blind field. In this respect, SL, tested with a broad
variety of stimulus features (Mazzi et al., 2016; Bollini et al.,
2017) reported some visual conscious experience of all kind of
stimuli presented contralaterally to her lesion in a considerable
number of trials (see Mazzi et al., 2017b for a review of older
pieces of evidence on conscious experience within the “blind”
field of hemianopic patients). Importantly, she could grade
conscious visual experience within her “blind” field and the
corresponding ERPs revealed differential neural activity with
respect to when stimuli remained undetected (Bollini et al., 2017;
Sanchez-Lopez et al., 2017; Mazzi et al., 2018b)1. Moreover,
her electrophysiological data were similar, both in latency and
topography, to those observed with healthy participants using
stimuli at detection threshold level (Tagliabue et al., 2016), thus
suggesting a normal pattern of neural activity even in the absence
of a functioning V1.
These results show that a complete V1 lesion does not prevent
from generating conscious visual experience. Instead, perceptual
awareness is still possible against the predictions of Lamme’s
model. These data point out that V1 and feedback to it cannot be
considered part of the network constituting the proper correlates
of awareness (Silvanto, 2015), thus positing for a re-consideration
1In some papers data are shown as a group but the effects are present at single
subject level also.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 April 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 965
Mazzi and Savazzi Single-Cases in the Neuroimaging Era
of Lamme’s model. Importantly, these data do not exclude
the importance of recurrent processing among visual areas
(e.g., extrastriate visual areas V2/V3 as shown by Horton and
Hoyt, 1991 and Slotnick and Moo, 2003), in line with other
accounts postulating the importance of synchronous activity
between visual areas (Pollen, 1999; Silvanto, 2015).
With respect to the preclusion to reach consciousness for
activity along the dorsal stream, it may be predicted that
direct stimulation of IPS should not result in conscious visual
experience. A reliable way to induce conscious visual percepts
is to apply TMS over visually responsive areas in order to
obtain the so-called phosphenes, i.e., conscious experience of
light in the absence of light entering the eyes. To test whether
the dorsal stream is part of the neural correlates of awareness,
we stimulated SL ipsilesional IPS. Results showed that SL could
experience reliable phosphenes rating their perceptual qualities
in a manner similar to that of controls and that her conscious
reports fitted well with a psychophysical detection function
similar to that observed in healthy participants (Mazzi et al.,
2014). Moreover, in a TMS-EEG study (Bagattini et al., 2015),
we observed that SL’s visual percepts induced by IPS-TMS
correlated with early activity within IPS. This suggests that IPS
itself can be part of the neural correlates of consciousness,
at least under these conditions. Importantly, these results
cannot, again, be explained by feedback activity reaching V1,
as V1 is lacking in SL. Notably, analogous findings have
been found with both healthy participants (Bagattini et al.,
2015) and another brain-damaged patient, AM, presenting
with altitudinal hemianopia on his upper visual field as a
result of an ischemic stroke involving V1 (Mazzi et al.,
2017a), thus suggesting a possible generalization of the results.
Conversely, other authors argue for an involvement of the intact
hemisphere in generating aware experience as a consequence
of an ipsilesional stimulation. This is the case of patient GY
since the stimulation of his ipsilesional hMT+/V5 (which is part
of the dorsal stream) did not result in phosphenes perception
unless accompanied by the concomitant stimulation of the
homologous area in his intact hemisphere (Silvanto et al., 2007,
see Bagattini et al., 2015 for a possible explanation of these
contrasting results).
In sum, these results advocate for a re-consideration about
the dorsal stream properties of Milner and Goodale’s model.
Indeed, the prediction that activity in IPS is not accompanied
with perceptual experience has proved not to be satisfactory
in all respects, such as when a verbal conscious report is
requested, there is no time pressure in executing the command
or no complex or stereotyped actions are required. However,
it remains highly plausible that visuo-motor transformations
need to be performed in a fast and automatic manner, thus
advocating for unconscious processing. As it has recently
been suggested (Milner, 2017), the two streams would not be
totally segregated but the ventral and dorsal streams would
communicate at higher hierarchical levels. This possibility
suggests that conscious experience correlating with stimulation
of IPS results from the activation of the ventral stream. This
possible explanation, though, contrasts with the results on both
healthy participants (Bagattini et al., 2015) and brain-damaged
patients (Bagattini et al., 2015; Mazzi et al., 2017a) showing
that the most likely generators of IPS-phosphenes are, indeed,
IPS and not the temporal cortex. It must, however, be said
that the technique used, i.e., TMS-EEG co-registration, does not
possess the spatial resolution needed to conclusively localize
neural activity. Future research should address this question
by applying TMS over SL’s IPS while concurrently recording
fast near-infrared optical signal (Parks et al., 2015). This
technique, indeed, is characterized by the adequate spatial
and temporal resolution to record fast changes of neural
activity and to assess the exact neural source of it while the
patient experiences conscious percepts within her/his “blind”
visual field.
Taken together, results obtained with patient SL on the
involvement of both V1 and IPS in the emergence of awareness
are important in the context of consciousness research. Indeed,
a debate exists on the identification of which brain areas are
crucial for consciousness (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Boly
et al., 2017). The results presented here provide additional pieces
of evidence in favor of the existence of a posterior cortical “hot
zone,” comprising temporal, occipital and parietal cortices, as
the content-specific neural correlates of awareness (Koch et al.,
2016), that is the neural correlates of the subjective, phenomenal,
conscious experience of the external world.
An important note of caution with respect to the role
of V1 and IPS in awareness relates to the variety of results
present in literature obtained with other extensively studied
hemianopic patients, such as FS, GY, and DB, both across
patients and across testing conditions within the same patient.
With the exception of DB, which lesion extension cannot
be ascertained with fMRI, FS, and GY (Stoerig et al.,
1998; Goebel et al., 2001) showed no activity in V1 but
only in extrastriate areas (i.e., hMT+/V5, LO, and V4/V8).
These blindsight patients almost never reported conscious
experience within their blind field, suggesting that activity
in V1 might be essential for conscious vision whereas
activity within ventral and dorsal streams is not sufficient
for awareness to emerge. Importantly though, the fact that,
under certain testing conditions, these patients could experience
conscious percepts (Stoerig and Barth, 2001; Stoerig, 2006;
Mazzi et al., 2017b) makes it essential, for future research,
to deeply investigate hemianopic patients, with a variety
of visual stimulation conditions and neuroimaging methods
to understand how and which areas, among those thought
to contribute to conscious vision, show overlapping results
and which ones, instead, show only condition-specific results
(Weiskrantz et al., 1995; Kleiser et al., 2001; Stoerig, 2001,
Stoerig, 2006).
CONCLUSIONS
As aptly stated by Chatterjee (2005) “a paradigmatic advance
in methods is being taken for a paradigmatic shift in
understanding.” The undoubtable advantages brought into the
field of cognitive neuroscience by neuroimaging techniques
somehow obscured the importance of extensively studying
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single neurological patients. However, the example of perceptual
awareness given in this opinion paper with patient SL
shows that results from single-case studies can bring new
evidence by testing the predictions of well-regarded theoretical
models. In our opinion, since this approach has proven
to be helpful in one specific field, it might be helpful in
general and it would make valuable advancements in scientific
knowledge. We, thus, stress the need for a renaissance of
the use of lesion studies, together with modern imaging
techniques, as a primary tool to investigate the brain-
behavior relationship.
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